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CAN DIGITAL SPEECH LOOSEN THE GORDIAN KNOT 
OF REPUTATION LAW? 
Elizabeth A. Kirley†
This paper likens the current state of reputation law to a 
Gordian knot, entangled in complexities and calling for novel 
thinking to make it relevant to our public and private lives. Its central 
thesis is that digital speech is ontologically different from offline 
speech and so calls for a more informed response to the harms it can 
inflict in order to determine whether legal or extra-legal mechanisms  
are most restorative. In spite of a wealth of international norms that 
address the value of personal reputation, they have had minimal 
influences on regional and domestic laws of the European Union and 
the United States, reflecting the deeply rooted cultural differences on 
each side of the Atlantic that shape laws of privacy and free speech. 
In conclusion, implications for future methods of addressing online 
reputational harm outside of traditional legal systems are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION
Legend of early Indo-Europeans tells of the king of Phrygia 
tying his cart to a public post with an intricate knot of bark. After 
centuries of locals attempting to disentangle the knot, Alexander the 
Great devised a simple, but untried solution: he sliced it with his 
sword, thereby fulfilling Zeus’ prophecy that the victor would become 
king of all Asia. Alexander was clearly thinking outside the box. 
This paper likens the current state of reputation law to a Gordian 
knot, entangled in complexities and calling for novel thinking to make 
it relevant to both our public and private lives. Its central thesis is that 
digital speech, meaning communications on social media or other 
messaging platforms that are more amateurish, spontaneous and 
conversational than well researched speech aimed at a broader 
audience, is sufficiently different in kind from offline speech that it 
calls for a more informed response to the reputational harms it can 
inflict. Due to this ontological difference, rigorous, interdisciplinary 
research is needed to determine whether traditional legal responses or 
extra-legal solutions will be most restorative. Those harms are not to 
be underestimated in the emotional, financial and professional 
damage they can impose. They relate to the Internet’s idiosyncrasies 
of memory, global distribution, telescoping of time, and the easy 
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acceptance of anonymity. Their sting can be felt through online 
invective and false stories or unauthorized exposure of personal data. 
In order to respond to free expression/privacy tensions, we need to 
understand the language, motivations and literacy of trolls, flamers, 
anarchists, militants, business competitors, jihadists and all those who 
aim to destroy our social, professional and financial identity as 
individuals.
This topic has universal importance because the social impact of 
lost reputation can be profound. We stand to lose our social and 
professional worth at the hands of vengeful ex-lovers, disgruntled 
employees or mean spirited trolls who work anonymously. Common 
law systems seem incapable of producing legal responses that can 
ease that suffering; the Internet, rather than utilizing its enhanced 
features of global dissemination and instantaneous response as 
steward of our reputational privacy, has served more as facilitator of 
harm. 
The paper begins by noting that, although international law 
offers a wealth of legal norms for the protection of reputation through 
the lens of private and family life, those values have failed to inspire 
clearly stated laws or jurisprudence on the domestic level. The 
disappointing result has been the second tier status that jurists 
frequently allocate to reputational privacy in deference to free speech. 
While more recent privacy and data protection laws strive to right that 
imbalance, few are effective in rehabilitating one’s dignity, honor and 
personality rights (as valued in the European tradition) or the 
American balancing of a right to be left alone and speech freedoms, 
as increasingly informed by the first amendment, section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act,1 and the more recent SPEECH Act.2
That conflict of norms means that, when it comes to online social 
media messaging, addressing reputational damage calls for thinking 
outside the box. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I examines international 
instruments for their influence on regional (EU) and domestic (US) 
law and details how those legal responses have produced quite 
discrete bodies of law on each side of the Atlantic, reflecting diverse 
 1. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230 
 2. Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act 
(SPEECH Act), P.L. 111-223, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105, which bars U.S. courts, both 
state and federal, from recognizing or enforcing a foreign judgment for defamation unless 
certain requirements, including consistency with the U.S. Constitution and section 230 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 230), are satisfied. 
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cultural values that shape them.  Part II examines how reputational 
harm might be perpetrated and impediments to traditional legal 
responses. In Part III the ontological difference between online and 
offline speech is explored and extra-legal responses to reputational 
jeopardy are canvassed. The paper concludes with suggestions for 
future explication of reputational damage from digital speech and 
misuse of personal data. 
I. INTERNATIONAL & DOMESTIC REPUTATION LAWS
Since the end of World War II, the international community has 
formulated a wealth of significant legal conventions that address 
reputation, primarily by framing those concerns broadly within values 
of privacy, family life, and personal dignity. Signatories acknowledge 
our entitlement to those protections as members of the human race. 
Although world wars have shrunk to more regional and asymmetric 
conflicts in the ensuing decades, the ambit of our interpersonal 
communications have gone the other way, expanding from localized 
gossip to instantaneous global dissemination of our secrets and stigma 
via Internet and social messaging. 
We might anticipate, therefore, that the wide selection of 
international norms regarding privacy and reputation would provide a 
conceptual reference point and inspiration to domestic laws. 
Similarly, with the emergence of the Internet and social media as the 
dominant interpersonal messaging tools over the past decade, it would 
be reasonable to expect the evolution of digital-specific laws to 
protect our virtual presence from verbal attacks and data exposure that 
jeopardize our future opportunities of a social, professional and 
financial nature. Unfortunately for law reform, we see that those 
international values seldom seep down to domestic laws or 
jurisprudence. 
A.  Conventions & Declarations 
1.  UDHR & ICCPR 
Two 20th century international instruments expressly address 
reputation as a basic human right, the first crafted by United Nations 
members as they emerged from the destruction and atrocities of the 
Second World War and the second, somewhat ironically, created in 
the midst of the Vietnam War of the mid-1960s. The Universal 
2016] REPUTATIONAL HARMS OF DIGITAL SPEECH 175
Declaration of Human Rights3 (UDHR) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 (ICCPR) use almost identical 
wording to stipulate that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
attacks upon his honor and reputation” and that “everyone has the 
right to protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”5
The ICCPR only addresses interference and attacks that are 
“unlawful.”6
The UDHR in article 19 also addresses a human right to free 
speech “through any medium and regardless of frontiers.”7 Reputation 
is treated as a right devolving from social and political life, and is 
significantly broader than the protections against violent and arbitrary 
treatment with which the UDHR begins. As one source explains, the 
UDHR leaves larger scope for variation in different social and 
political contexts, because “individuals everywhere have the right to 
be free of torture, but different countries may legitimately come to 
different conclusions about the conditions under which private 
property may be taken for public use.”8 Such differential treatment 
sets up the conditions for a hierarchy of rights in actual state practice. 
The US and EU Member States have all signed both the UDHR 
and the ICCPR and ratified the former treaty.9 Both treaties have 
enforcement bodies: for the UDHR several oversight mechanisms are 
provided.10 The ICCPR is monitored by the UN Human Rights 
 3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), at Article 12. International law creates a hierarchy of instruments: a 
convention (synonymous with treaty and covenant) is binding between states. Conventions are 
stronger than declarations that constitute an agreement of standards without legal enforcement. 
Declarations frequently are products of UN Conferences and can be produced by government 
representatives or NGOs. 
4.International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/2200A(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), at art. 17 [hereinafter International Covenant]. 
5. Id. Those instruments, in combination with the International Covenant On Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights, comprise the International Bill of Human Rights. 
6. Id. at art. 17(1). 
 7. “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) 
 8. Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
2 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 6 (2004). 
 9. The US signed on Oct. 5, 1977. EU Member States sign upon gaining EU 
membership. 
 10. Including the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Human Rights Council, and treaty-monitoring 
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Committee through regular reports from state parties on 
implementation of those rights. In practice enforcement for both 
treaties is more nominal than practical, however, with diplomatic 
pressure and other ‘soft law’ tools being preferred. 
The UDHR is not legally binding as such; it carries no formal 
legal obligations but might carry moral obligations or attain the force 
of law as customary international law.  Most of its rights had already 
received a significant degree of recognition by 1948 in the 
constitutions of many nations, if not in their practices. 
In the case of the ICCPR, the US and all EU Member states that 
are parties to the Convention must respect the provisions of the treaty, 
subject to reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs) 
requested by other signatories. One controversial RUD of 
considerable weight in foreign relations requested that the US 
Constitution prevail over any contested free speech issue involving 
the terms of the ICCPR. Another key RUD attached by the US Senate 
is a “non self-executing” Declaration, intended to limit the ability of 
litigants to sue in a US court for direct enforcement of the ICCPR. 
That Declaration effectively challenges any external enforcement 
mechanism. 
Cases relating to reputation that expressly reference the UDHR 
and the ICCPR are very limited; one reason might be the strength of 
RUDs requested by the US. Another could be the comparatively low 
value allotted to reputational harm and privacy invasions on the 
international spectrum of human rights violations. Remedies, as 
discussed in the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to 
Remedies, seem restricted to “gross” violations of International 
Human Rights Law and “serious” violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, a bar that indignities and social stigma caused by 
reputational injury might not be able to hurdle.11
In a report to the ICCPR Human Rights Committee in 2014, the 
US was criticized for its surveillance activities on foreign and US 
citizens12 that showed non-compliance with the privacy provisions in 
bodies like the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child.
11. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for the 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of the 
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
 12. Specifically highlighted were NSA’s bulk phone metadata surveillance program (§ 
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act); surveillance under § 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA), conducted through PRISM (collection of communications content 
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the ICCPR’s Article 17 and with international law principles of 
legality, proportionality and necessity.13 Although reputation rights 
were not expressly addressed, the report recommended that any 
interference with the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence
henceforth be authorized by laws that: 1) are publicly accessible; 2) 
are tailored to specific legitimate aims; 3) detail the precise 
circumstances of data collection and obtaining consent, and 4) 
provide for effective safeguards against abuse.14 Also listed as 
excessive invasions of personal privacy are practices of third parties 
such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to retain personal data for 
state use.15
The Human Rights Committee monitoring state compliance with 
the ICCPR has interpreted the convention’s free speech provisions as 
describing a much narrower right than that articulated in US 
constitutional laws. In any conflict between a US citizen’s free speech 
rights and those of a non-US citizen subject to a non-US free speech 
law, the US position is likely to prevail due to its wider legal ambit. 
That is particularly the case with hate speech, where the US 
subscribes to a wide tolerance: only incitement that is intended to 
cause imminent violence justifies restricting fundamental speech 
rights.16 Some EU states, however, such as Finland, Belgium, Iceland, 
and Denmark, oppose the term “hate speech” as potentially restricting 
democratic debate on religion and minorities.17 Those speech 
protections are broader still than those in American law and can have 
injurious results for individual reputation. 
The third pillar of an International Bill of Human Rights in 
concert with the UDHR and the ICCPR is the UN’s International
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights created in 1996. 
It does not expressly address reputation or privacy. Altogether the 
three treaties comprise a wide range of human rights that form an 
interrelated normative system. 
from United States-based Internet companies) and UPSTREAM (collection of communications 
metadata and content by tapping fiber-optic cables carrying Internet traffic). 
13. Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the 
United States of America, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights 
Committee (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.refworld.org/docid/5374afcd4.html. 
14. Id. at § 20(b) (emphasis added). 
15. Id. at § 20(c) and (d). 
16. See also Hate Speech, ARTICLE19.ORG, https://www.article19.org/pages/en/hate-
speech-more.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
17. Id.
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2.  International Convention on Migrant Workers & 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
A more recent addition to international law is the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families that requires protection for “privacy, 
family, correspondence or other communications” against “unlawful 
attacks on his or her honour and reputation.”18 With that treaty, even 
temporary citizens are afforded a basic right to a good reputation, 
although subordinated to “respect for the rights and reputation of 
others.”19
Other international instruments and initiatives that are relevant to 
reputation include the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(prohibiting arbitrary or unlawful interference with a child’s privacy, 
family, or correspondence, and unlawful attacks on his or her honor 
and reputation);20 the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (with similar provisions for the disabled, including 
protection from unlawful attacks on reputation and privacy rights for 
correspondence “and other types of communications”); 21 and the UN
Resolution on a Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations that
urges full utilization of communication technologies including the 
Internet to further global dialogue and understanding.22
All of the above reveal international consensus on the 
importance of reputation protection as a legal norm. Although 
 18. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990), at art. 
14.
19. Id. at art. 13(3)(a).
 20. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 
(Nov. 20, 1989), at Art. 16. (“1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his or her privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour 
and reputation”) (emphasis added). 
 21. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), at art. 22. (“1) No person with disabilities, regardless of place of 
residence or living arrangements, shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his or her privacy, family, or correspondence or other types of communication or to unlawful 
attacks on his or her honour and reputation. Persons with disabilities have the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks; 2) States Parties shall protect the 
privacy of personal, health and rehabilitation information of persons with disabilities on an 
equal basis with others”) (emphasis added). 
 22. Global Agenda For Dialogue Among Civilizations, G.A. Res. 56/6, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/56/6 (Nov. 21, 2001), at art. 9 (“Utilization of communication technologies, including 
audio, video, printed press, multimedia and the Internet, to disseminate the message of dialogue 
and understanding throughout the globe and depict and publicize historical instances of 
constructive interaction among different civilizations.”) (emphasis added). 
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repeated in regional instruments of the European Union (EU) 
reputation law does not trickle down to domestic (national) laws per
se, but only obliquely through laws of defamation or privacy. 
B.  Regional Responses to Reputation Law 
1.  European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
In contrast to the wealth of international treaties that expressly 
address reputation, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR)23 does not contain direct references to honor or reputation as 
a discrete human right; rather it makes the right of free expression 
subject to protection of “the reputation and rights of others.”24 The 
use of “reputation” as a qualification rather than a right seems 
deliberate, as appears from the preparatory work on Article 10 of the 
ECHR.25 The text of the ECHR approaches reputational protection 
obliquely, then, as a contingency that would limit free expression, 
similar to such occurrences as threats to national security, public 
safety, the economic well-being of the state, the prevention of 
disorder or crime, the protection of health and morals, and the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 26
Recognition of reputation as a right of equal import to speech 
was slow to come in EU case law. In the first defamation case brought 
under article 10 of the ECHR, Lingens v. Austria in 1986,27 the
 23. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 
1953, 213 U.N.T.S 222, (art. 10(2)) (ECHR), formulated by the Council of Europe after the 
Second World War ro provide for the first time human rights within Europe enforceable under 
international law and before a court independent of the nation states. Only states that belong to 
the Council of Europe can become parties to the ECHR. The ECHR is not an EU instrument, 
unlike the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that came into force in 2000 
for all EU member states that assembled into one instrument human rights from several previous 
treaties, including the ECHR. 
24. Id. at art. 10(2).
25. See also European Commission of Human Rights Preparatory Work on Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, SECRETARIAT OF THE 
COMMISSION, Doc. No. DH (56) 15 Or. Fr. (Aug. 17, 1956) (noting the following proposals that 
were made but did not appear in the final document: a French proposal that free speech could be 
limited by the protection of “the reputation or rights of other persons” (Dec. E/1371, p. 21); a 
UN conference on freedom of information suggesting that free speech be restricted by 
expressions by other persons that “defame their reputations or are otherwise injurious to them 
without benefiting the public.”  (§ 2(g) and a similar proposal by the British Government (§ 
8(3)(2)). Subsequent submissions to a Committee of Experts eliminated all references to 
“reputation.”).
 26. ECHR, supra note 21, at arts. 8, 10. 
 27. Lingens v. Austria 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407 (1986). Lingens published comments in a 
Vienna magazine characterizing behavior of the Austrian Chancellor as “basest opportunism,” 
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rejected the 
Government’s argument that the case concerned a conflict between 
two equal Convention rights; the court held that a right to reputation 
only served as qualifier of the right to free expression. With the 
Article 10 case of Chauvy and others v. France28 in 2004 and the 
article 8 case of Pfeifer v. Austria29 in 2007, however, the right to 
protection of reputation was recognized as having full Convention 
status. The Pfeifer case decided “a person’s right to protection of his 
or her reputation is encompassed by Article 8 as being part of the 
right to respect for private life”.30 With that case, European law had 
finally incorporated international legal norms expressed by the UDHR 
and ICCPR. 
That development has its critics: Stijn Smet of the University of 
Ghent criticizes the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for 
elevating reputation to convention rights status equal to its “strongest 
enemy.”31  Smet cites the ECtHR case of Polanco-Torres (where a 
judge’s wife fought defamatory claims that she and her husband 
engaged in unlawful business transactions) as a judicial attempt to 
balance the human rights pendulum that had swung too far on the side 
of reputation with Pfeifer. In Smet’s opinion the court wrongly set a 
high standard for proof of harm as one that “compromises personal 
integrity.”32 Smet is persuasive in arguing that, by creating the 
integrity standard, the ECtHR has created a situational right rather 
“immoral” and “undignified.” The Austrian criminal code provided the defense of truth but 
Lingens maintained they were value judgments and hence not within the four corners of that 
code. The ECtHR agreed and found a violation of Lingen’s article 10 free speech rights without 
addressing reputational harm.
 28. Chauvy and others v. France, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (2005), regarding a book that 
suggested by innuendo that Jean Moulin, Resistance Leader in WW2 was betrayed and killed 
because of the actions of Raymond Aubrac who escaped. (“The book is little more than pure 
conjecture and constitutes a direct assault on the integrity and identity of Mr and Mrs Aubrac 
that robs them of their dignity. It is necessary to reaffirm respect for human dignity as one of the 
most important Convention values and one which historical works must also foster.”) 
 29. Pfeifer v. Austria, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175 (2007) (regarding an article alleging the Jews 
attacked Germany in 1933 and trivializing the actions of the Nazi regime and stating “A 
person’s reputation, even if that person is criticised in the context of a public debate, forms part 
of his or her personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore also falls within the 
scope of his or her private life under Article 8.”). 
30. See also Stijn Smet, The Right to Reputation Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, STRASBOURGOBSERVERS.COM (Nov. 1, 2010), http://strasbourgobservers.com/
2010/11/01/the-right-to-reputation-under-the-european-convention-on-human-rights/.
31. Id. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) rules on European Union law while the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rules on the European Convention on Human Rights 
which covers the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. 
32. Id. 
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than balancing an existing right with a competing right of free speech 
using the traditional proportionality test. As a result, when applying 
the Polanco case “in some situations one enjoys a right to reputation 
and in others not.”33
2.  American Convention on Human Rights 
Across the Atlantic, the American Convention on Human Rights,
promoted by the Organization of American States (OAS) with state 
members in North, Central, and South America, sets out the right to 
privacy, honour and dignity.34 It prohibits arbitrary interference with 
the “right to privacy or one’s reputation” and stipulates that everyone 
has the right to protection of the law against attacks or interference 
with that right.35 It further subjects the right of expression to a 
“respect for the rights or reputations of others.”36 The Convention also 
provides for a right of reply to individual complaints of reputational 
violations through the designation by every publisher (including 
online publishers) of a person without immunity to respond to such 
complaints. 
The Convention was inspired by the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man (the Declaration of the Americas) that 
marked the modern world’s first general international human rights 
instrument, predating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by 
one year.37 The US and Cuba are the only parties not to have ratified 
the Convention, and a few states have actually attempted to rescind 
their ratification.38 In practice, the OAS and the Convention are seen 
as “more Latin American than Inter-American” and there is strong 
pressure for the US to become a State Party to alternative OAS Inter-
American treaties.39
 33. Smet, supra note 30. 
 34. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, Article 11 (“1. Everyone has the right to have his 
honour respected and his dignity recognized; 2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive 
interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful 
attacks on his honour or reputation; 3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference or attacks.”) (emphasis added). 
35. Id.
36. Id. at art. 13, § 2(a). 
37. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Inter Am. Comm’n H.R. 
(May 2, 1948). 
 38. Trinidad and Tobago has rescinded; Peru tried, but used the wrong procedure. 
 39. Monica Pinto, The Role of the Inter-American Commission and the Court of Human 
Rights in the Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Contemporary Challenges, 20
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2 (2013).
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Although not well known outside of the legislative histories of 
the parties, the Declaration of the Americas has been referenced in the 
jurisprudence of both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACHR), created by the OAS, and the work of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. The latter functions as a court of first 
instance and works at enforcement of the Declaration of the Americas 
in all OAS Member States. 
Akin to its position regarding the ICCPR, the US holds that its 
own laws provide the same or stronger human rights protections than 
those of the Declaration of the Americas, in spite of its lack of a 
centralized data protection regime. As testament, the IACHR 
jurisprudence lacks any cases of US origin. Key objections in the US 
to OAS rights protections relate to issues of federalism, sovereignty, 
and incompatibility with US domestic laws, most prominently the US 
Constitution.40 In political terms, US exceptionalism regarding OAS 
activities is heavily criticized by other members of the Convention 
that aim to exclude US participation.41
In addition, the US is signatory to many of the international 
conventions outlined above but on the domestic front, as we shall see, 
there is no direct mention in the US Constitution of “reputation” or 
“privacy” and data protection laws are formulated on an ad hoc and 
sectoral basis, producing a patchwork of protections across the 
country.
3.  Data Protection in Europe 
Reputational privacy can be adversely affected by the 
unauthorized disclosure of personal data, an act that occurs each time 
Internet users log on to search engines such as Google or the social 
networking site Facebook or other web service companies that 
transmit their personal identifying information across geopolitical 
borders. Companies such as Facebook, Google, Apple, LinkedIn, Dell 
40. Id. at 21 (advising the US to ratify the American Convention to show international 
leadership regarding human rights). 
 41. The term “U.S. exceptionalism” is used here to indicate the belief that, unlike other 
states, the United States does not need to ratify international human rights treaties because its 
domestic legal system provides the same or better protections. See Stephen M. Walt, The Myth 
of American Exceptionalism, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Oct. 11, 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/
2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism. See also Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi, U.S.
Exceptionalism and the Strengthening Process of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 
AM. U. HUM. RTS. BRIEF (2012), http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/20/2juaristi.pdf (noting 
that US exceptionalism has left the Inter-American Human Rights System vulnerable to attacks 
on its legitimacy and credibility).
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and Intel, for example, store their user data in Ireland, a corporate 
decision that translates into massive amounts of user information 
leaving countries of origin. As we shall see, data protection policies 
within the Council of Europe and European Union member states 
build on a long-held cultural respect for dignity of individuals by 
sheer virtue of their humanity. Policy makers in the US, by contrast, 
give innovative leadership and free speech pride of place in policy 
decisions and lawmaking. Those culturally entrenched and political 
relevant differences have wide ranging effects on international efforts 
to agree on an international technology policy as smart technologies, 
including digital communications, are introduced into more and more 
areas of society. 
With respect to data protection law in Europe,42 two international 
instruments are crucial to ongoing oversight of transborder data flow 
that could intrude on citizens’ reputational privacy: the Council of 
Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 
108),43 and the 1980 Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data, drafted by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 
Guidelines).44 Those rules were devised to deal specifically with 
personal information that crosses international borders, targeting the 
adequacy of protection afforded citizens in the exporting country. The 
former, Convention 108, was devised in pre-Internet days and has 
42. See generally Meg (Ambrose) Jones, A Right to a Human in the Loop: Legal 
Constructions of Computer Automation & Personhood from Data Banks to Algorithms, SSRN
(Aug. 1, 2016),  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2758160. 
43. European Treaty Series – No. 108, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, (Jan. 28, 1981) 
[hereinafter ETS No. 108]. The Convention has 53 signatories from Europe, Asia, South 
America and North Africa. See also Graham Greenleaf ‘Modernising’ Data Protection 
Convention 108: A Safe Basis for a Global Privacy Treaty? 29 COMPUTER. L. & SEC. REV. 4 
(2013) (documenting efforts to globalize Convention 108 to protect the transborder flow of data 
related to EU citizens and to enjoin non-European states in protection of their citizens within a 
globalized information flow and communications environment). 
 44. Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND Development (July 11, 2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-
privacy-guidelines.pdf.  See also New Technologies and Their Impact on Regulation, ICT
REGULATION TOOLKIT, http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/1.7 (last visited April 7, 2016) 
(discussing secondary use of data and enforcement of privacy guidelines); OECD 
Recommendation on Cross-border Co-operation in the Enforcement of Laws Protecting Privacy, 
OECD.ORG (2007), http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/38770483.pdf; Jennifer Stoddard, 
Thirty Years After The OECD Guidelines, OECD.ORG (2011), http://www.oecd.org/sti/
ieconomy/49710223.pdf (discussing historical overview). 
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been described by the European Data Protection Supervisor as the 
only legally binding international treaty dealing with privacy and data 
protection.45 It outlaws the processing of sensitive data on a person’s 
race, politics, health, religion, sexual life, criminal record, etc., in the 
absence of proper legal safeguards. The Convention also enshrines the 
individual’s right to know that information is stored on him or her 
and, if necessary, to have it corrected. It applies to both private and 
public authorities, such as police organizations, but has been heavily 
criticized for lack of enforcement mechanisms and for its Euro-
centered membership.46
Convention 108 places more emphasis on protection of human dignity 
and human rights through individual control of our data but does not 
expressly mention “reputation” or the personal cost of data misuse.47
So too, the original OEDC Guidelines did not express concerns over 
individual reputation; revisions in 2013 mention reputation for the 
first time within the context of the “reputational impact” and “loss of 
trust or confidence” caused to individuals by organizations that 
experience a data breach, whether by inadvertence, negligence, or 
victimization at the hands of data thieves.48 Both the 108 Convention 
and OEDC Guidelines are under continuous review but, despite those 
efforts, they have been criticized as ineffectual, as  “burdensome to 
those whose motives are benign and ineffective towards those more 
malignly inclined.” 49
The EU Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data (95 Directive), inspired by Convention 108, was devised in 
the mid-1990s when personal computers were not widespread and 
45. Questions and Answers, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, https://
secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Dataprotection/QA (last visited April 7, 2016).
 46. Jorg Polakiewicz, Convention 108 As a Global Privacy Standard? INTERNATIONAL
DATA PROTECTION CONFERENCE (June 17, 2011), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/
DataProtection/TPD_documents/
Convention_108as_a_global_privacy_standards_June_2011.pdf. 
 47. ETS No. 108, supra 43, at preamble (“that it is necessary, given the diversification, 
intensification and globalisation of data processing and exchanges of personal data, to guarantee 
human dignity and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of every person, in 
particular through the right to control one’s personal data and the processing of such data.”). 
48. Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum To The Revised OECD Privacy 
Guidelines, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 26 (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf.
 49. Sylvia Kierkegaard et al., 30 Years On - The Review of the Council of Europe Data 
Protection Convention 108, 23 COMPUTER. L. & SEC. REV. 223, 231 (2011). 
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data privacy regulation was viewed as “a niche activity”.50 Both 
instruments use technologically neutral language, as does the OEDC 
Guidelines, to avoid the dating of laws through reference to specific 
technologies that would be replaced over time. 51  What they provide 
are broad principles that serve as a template for the more 
technologically specific General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
that was adopted at the EU level on April 14, 2016, after four years of 
drafting and negotiations; it is now officially EU law, replacing the 95 
Directive and all national data protection legislation.52
While the 95 Directive did not expressly address the protection 
of “reputation,” it set out the objective of protecting a “right to 
privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data.”53 The GDPR 
improves on that with two references to “reputation,” but in the 
preamble rather than in the regulation proper:54 the first recognizes 
risks to rights and freedoms, such as damage to reputation; the second 
reference includes reputational damage in a listing of general 
physical, material or non-material damage to natural persons arising 
from data misuse.55 Interestingly there were eleven such references in 
the working draft. 
Other, more innovative, provisions grant the right of access to 
data by the data subject56 and the right to an effective remedy for 
misuse or leakage, some within a month of the transgression.57 Those 
competent authorities have jurisdiction over online activities that fall 
within the scope of EU law only, that is, for activities of data 
processors located within the EU, whether or not processing is carried 
out in the EU.58 Most notable for those who subscribe to a ‘right to be 
 50. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281/31) (EC) [hereinafter 95 Directive]. 
 51. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council 
Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and 
Information Services’ (EC) No. 98/C 214/07 of 10 July 1998, 1998 O.J. (C 214) 25, § 3.2.5 
(defining technologically neutral language: “Regulation should be ‘technology-neutral’: as few 
as possible new regulations, policies and procedures should be specific to the new services.”). 
52. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation or GDPR). 
 53. Counsel Directive 95/46, supra note 50, at art. 1. 
 54. Such references would provide interpretation guidelines, not law. 
 55. .GDPR, supra fn 52, Preamble paras. 75 and 85. 
 56. .Id., at Section 2, particularly Art. 15. 
 57. .Id., at art. 12.4, Art. 77 and Art. 79. 
58. Id. at art. 3.1. It also applies to processing outside of the EU where goods or services 
are offered online to EU residents. 
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forgotten’ as a reputational privacy mechanism for online content, and 
as suggested in preliminary proposals of the European Commission, 
the GDPR contains both a right of deletion of personal data and a 
right to restrict processing.59 Conditions for granting a right of 
deletion include: where the personal data are no longer necessary for 
the purposes for which they were collected; the data subject 
withdraws the original consent for their use; or they were processed 
illegally. A right to restrict personal data processing arises where the 
accuracy of the personal data is contested by the data subject; or when 
further processing is unlawful or outside the scope of the original 
consent.
One concern about the new GDPR regime is the potential 
disparity between data collection laws from one member state to the 
next.  While the GDPR applies uniformly to all EU member states by 
virtue of their membership, and legal uses of data are set out in 
Article 6, (by consent, to perform a contract, for legal obligations or 
public interest tasks of the controller,), there is some wiggle room 
under 6(2) for individual states to further define which activities are 
legally permissible within its borders; it remains to be seen how 
Internet services that transmit data across internal borders of the EU 
might get entangled in those legal differences from one country to the 
next. 
Data transmission and storage have increased considerably with 
the new mobility of messaging and the novel features offered on cell 
phones and tablets. With such major shifts in the portability of data, 
and the unconstitutionality of the US-EU safe harbour arrangements 
as decided by the CJEU in the Maximillian Schrems case,60 the EU-
US Privacy Shield has come into effect. Its emergence and 
importance for reputational privacy will be discussed below.61
59. Id. at art. 17 and 18 respectively. 
 60. Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, Case C-362/14, 6 October 2015 
(Schrems I).
 61. As early as 1999 the ARTICLE 29 Working Party, a group of European data 
protection officials, was of the opinion in 1999 that the “patchwork of narrowly focused sectoral 
laws and voluntary self regulation [of US data transmissions] cannot be relied upon to provide 
adequate protection in all cases for personal data transferred from the European Union.” 
WORKING PARTY ON THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF 
PERSONAL DATA, Opinion 1/99 concerning the level of Data Protection in the United States and 
the Ongoing Discussion between the European Commission and the United States Government, 
at p. 4, DG MARKT DOC 5098, WP 15 (Jan. 26, 1999). 
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4.  E-Privacy Protection in Europe 
Two additional EU directives relate expressly to online 
information and aim at protecting personal reputation. The Electronic 
Commerce Directive, (e-Commerce Directive 2000)62 provides legal 
certainty for EU businesses and consumers alike on issues such as 
information requirements for online service providers,63 the execution 
of electronic contracts, and limitations of liability of ISPs.64 Under the 
e-Commerce Directive, ISPs are subject to the law of the Member 
State in which the service provider is established. In turn, the Member 
State whose residents receive the service cannot arbitrarily restrict 
incoming services.65
The second directive influencing online personal data is the 
Directive on the Retention of Data (e-Privacy Directive)66 that relates 
to publicly available electronic communications or public networks, 
such as mobile phone and texting data plan companies. The Directive 
requires those companies to store citizens’ telecommunications data 
for a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 24 months, to allow 
for official scrutiny by government agents if authorized by law, and is 
intended to curb data retention beyond an individual’s original 
consent. The e-Privacy directive enables the police and security 
agencies to access details such as the IP address and time of use of 
every email, phone call and text message sent or received. A 2014 
decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v Ireland & Karntner Landesregierng & 
others, ruled certain provisions of the e-Privacy Directive 
unconstitutional in that they are so broad as to permit mass 
surveillance by state authorities that challenge fundamental human 
rights.67
 62. Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular 
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce) (EC) No. 
2000/31 of June 8, 2000, O.J. [hereinafter e-Commerce Directive].
 63. For example, agents who receive tax information filed online. 
64. The EU Single Market: E-Commerce Directive, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/directive/index_en.htm (last updated Mar. 20, 2014). 
65. Id.
 66. Directive on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the 
Provision of Publically Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public 
Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC (EC) No. 2006/24 of 15 
March 2006, O.J. [hereinafter ePrivacy Directive]. 
 67. Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v Ireland & 
Karntner Landesregierng et al., 2014 E.C.R. (April 8, 2014) (seeking preliminary ruling on 
ePrivacy Directive (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 54) in the light of Articles 7, 9 and 11 of the CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION [Digital Rights Ireland]). 
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In conclusion, throughout the 20th century European efforts to 
protect reputation produced a centralized body of statutory law that, 
as we will see below, contrasted with developments in America.68 The 
persistent influence over the ages of the Roman law of ius natural or
natural justice can be seen as an enduring theme in harmonizing laws 
requisite for the formation of the EU. Today, Europeans continue to 
look to EU statute law to protect their fundamental interests in 
reputational privacy. 
The rights status granted to reputation in several international 
conventions has not been readily reflected in the state laws or 
jurisprudence of individual EU Member States. One explanation 
might be that rights to privacy have historically been addressed 
through actions for civil and criminal defamation, breach of 
confidentiality and insult law, precedent that has undergone a 
particular uneven history in terms of its conceptual development, its 
location in public or private law, and the requisite evidentiary 
standards of proof for a claim in either civil or criminal law. 
Gradually, the courts of the EU have acknowledged protection of 
reputation as a full status right. Most recently, the results of the 
Schrems and Digital Rights Ireland cases have signaled CJEU 
heightened concerns over data privacy during transatlantic 
transmission of data pertaining to EU citizens. That transmission has 
been accelerated by innovative technologies that have enabled 
wireless transmission, digital messaging and government data 
surveillance, all of which have implications for reputation rights. 
C.  Domestic Responses in the US Relative to European Nations 
Concern for reputational privacy and data protection has moved 
in a very different direction in the US than in Europe.69 There is no 
mention of “reputation” in the US Constitution, although freedom of 
speech figures prominently in the First Amendment and privacy in the 
Fourth. Neither is there is any federal data protection law, and 
individual privacy rights were not recognized in federal law until the 
Privacy Act 1974, despite a proposal for one by Warren and Louis 
 68. Paul M. Schwartz and Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German Right 
of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts Better than One Unitary Concept? 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1925, 1947 (2010).
 69. The US Constitution is silent on reputation rights, although case law on free speech 
has obliquely created legal parameters for protection of personal reputation. See further for 
historical perspective, George C. Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion 
And Conflicting Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV. 43 (1976). 
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Brandeis near the close of the 19th century.70 State privacy laws have 
evolved to fill the legislative gap in a sector-specific and ad hoc 
fashion that creates doctrinal and procedural discrepancies between 
one state and another regarding, for instance, public laws in health, 
industry and insurance. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the 
common law has developed, albeit with uneven results. The 
development of data protection laws has followed a similar course. 
For reputational damage perpetrated onto another, the common 
law offers defamation law, privacy law and, under the influence of 
UK practices, breach of confidentiality.71 US causes of action tend to 
focus on loss of social esteem and goodwill or a loss of social capital 
in economic terms. In contrast, legal principles of continental Europe, 
reflected in the ECHR and other statutes, tend to link reputation to 
one’s dignity or honor among peers. To defame that dignity is to 
challenge the positive public appraisal of the person; to damage 
another’s honor is to mar the self-appraisal of his own public 
significance.72
In Harvard Dean William Prosser’s estimate, the common law of 
defamation is full of “absurdities for which no legal writer ever has 
had a kind word.”73 Without going into detailed case analysis, the 
following principles indicate the intricacies and inconsistencies of 
defamation jurisprudence that bear out Prosser’s assessment. In the 
US, truth is accepted as an absolute defense in some state 
jurisdictions, but not in others.74 Truth is not accepted as a defense in 
privacy invasion cases that involve damages to reputation. A 
statement does not need to be literally true in order for this defense to 
 70. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Publ. L. No. 93-579), 88 Stat. 1896 (31 Dec. 
1974); see further, Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Private Property, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
 71. A case for defamation should exhibit the following elements: the publication to third 
parties of a harmful statement about the plaintiff that causes her public embarrassment and/or 
professional and financial suffering, and is made without adequate research into the truthfulness 
of the statement. When those elements are present, and the plaintiff is reduced in the social 
estimation of her community as a result, a private case in defamation is usually made out at 
common law. 
 72. Defamation and Freedom of Expression, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MEDIA DIVISION,
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (March 2003). In addition, the French Press Act of 
1881 remained faithful to the spirit of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens
that proclaimed the freedom of the press “save to respond to the abuse of this liberty, in the 
cases determined by the law”, ie to defamatory statements (art. 11). For American-European 
cultural differences in perceptions of privacy, see James Q. Whitman, The Two Western 
Cultures Of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J., 1151 passim (2004). 
 73. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 737 (4ed. 1971). 
74. Cf. a claim for invasion of privacy in the US where truth provides no defense. 
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be effective, just substantially true in the legal sense. This means that 
even if the defendant states some facts that are false, if the “gist” or 
“sting” of the communication is substantially true, then the defendant 
can prevail.75 A plaintiff who is a public official or celebrity must 
prove both falsity and malice on the part of the defendant.76 The US 
Supreme Court has held that private individuals can secure a remedy 
in defamation simply by proving negligence, as opposed to a higher 
standard of intent on the part of a media defendant.77
Similarly, a 2015 study of EU civil defamation laws regarding 
how helpful they are to journalists, concluded that most were unclear 
and confusing and that, when writing for publication, “vagueness is 
the name of the game” to escape civil liability.78 Only Ireland, 
Macedonia and the UK were named as having passed legislation 
specific to defamation that reasonably conforms to international 
standards and that would assist journalists.79
Further confusion has been experienced in both Europe and the 
US over criminal defamation laws that use penal sanctions to respond 
to insults, criticism and defamatory behavior involving public 
officials and heads of state. Such laws are remarkably widespread: 
nearly 20 US states retain criminal defamation laws;80 within the EU, 
20 member states have retained criminal defamation laws on their 
books despite persistent pressure to repeal them.81
The development of privacy law in America in response to 
reputational injury was much more meticulous in its taxonomy due in 
 75. Gomba v. McLaughlin, 180 Colo. 232, 236 (Colo. 1972).
 76. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-292 (1964). Sullivan did not 
prevail, as he could not establish that the statements were made with actual malice or that they 
related to him.
 77. Gertz v. Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 78. . Scott Griffen, OUT OF BALANCE: Defamation Law in the European Union: A 
Comparative Overview for Journalists, Civil Society and Policymakers, http://
legaldb.freemedia.at/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IPI-OutofBalance-Final-Jan2015.pdf 
(providing a comparison of defamation laws in EU states). 
 79. The study also notes that Austria, Croatia and Luxembourg have passed general 
media legislation that specifically addresses defamation and provides most relevant defenses.  
 80. David Pritchard, Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study, 14 COMM. L. &
POL’Y, 303 (2009) (listing Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands as having criminal 
defamation laws). Colorado repealed its criminal defamation laws in 2012. 
81. Defamation Laws in Europe - Media Laws Database, INTERNATIONAL PRESS
INSTITUTE, http://legaldb.freemedia.at/defamation-laws-in-europe (last visited April 8, 2016) 
(listing only Cyprus, Montenegro, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Romania, Macedonia and 
Estonia as having repealed criminal defamation laws). 
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large measure to William Prosser. He devised an intricate inventory 
of laws to address not only invasions into personal seclusion but such 
wrongs as appropriation of the name of another, public disclosure of 
private facts “not a matter of legitimate public concern”, and 
disclosure of private facts that portray the victim in a false light.82 The 
law of privacy in America thereby veered away from the European 
model, including the law of confidentiality, to create a new 
conception of privacy based on the individual’s “inviolate 
personality.”83
Prosser’s work has been criticized as too regimental in its 
categorization. For victims of reputational exposure, his privacy torts 
present a confusing and often illogical combination of legal principles 
and practices. For example, they contain such arbitrary inclusions as 
the “right of publicity” (that protects a celebrity’s intellectual property 
from misappropriation and hence financial deprivation) within the 
“appropriation” category (that protects the private person from the 
emotional harm of unwanted publicity). To some, such results 
produce contrivances that do not work well in practice.84
Most controversial are the uneven results played out in court. For 
example, false light claims are recognized in only about two-thirds of 
US states due to their doctrinal overlap with defamation actions. 
There are distinctions, however, that justify Prosser’s inclusion of 
both torts. For instance, false light actions are not subject to limitation 
and retraction statutes unlike defamation actions. In terms of 
substantive differences, false light claims have no access to defenses 
available to the press in defamation actions: while truth is a complete 
defense to defamation, true statements are actionable under false light 
law.85 Journalists must therefore be particularly wary of attracting 
false light claims because defendants can be successful even if the 
story is true in its entirety.86
 82. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
 83. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887 passim (2010).
 84. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L. J., 123, 125 (2007) (arguing that Warren and Brandeis did not invent 
the law of privacy from meager precedents of the common law but took it in a new direction). 
 85. Patricia Avidan, Protecting the Media’s First Amendment Rights in Florida: Making 
False Light Plaintiffs Play by Defamation Rules, 35 STET. L. REV. 227 (2005). 
86. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. Anderson, 947 So. 2d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (where the 
owner of a road-paving company was awarded $18.28 million for a true report that he had shot 
his wife but that provided a statement that the authorities ruled the shooting accidental two
sentences after the original mention of the shooting, thereby putting his name in a false light. 
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As well, false light requires the dissemination of offending 
content to a wide audience, whereas defamation claims can rest on the 
perceptions of a smaller number of recipients. The principal doctrinal 
difference rests in the interest the law seeks to protect: defamation 
protects the objective interest of reputation while false light protects 
the subjective interest of emotional injury causing personal 
embarrassment, helplessness or mere hurt feelings.87 The conceptual 
vagueness of those terms has prompted journalists to complain about 
the tort’s chilling effect on their First Amendment rights.88
Those transatlantic discrepancies in legal responses to 
reputational privacy threats exist within a broader nationalization 
trend that illustrates state authorities are beginning to take more notice 
of the risks of exporting their citizens’ personal data. In Europe, for 
example, German’s privacy federation has threatened to sue US-based 
Pokemon-Go developer Niantic Labs for over 15 violations of 
German privacy law;89 and in France, the data protection regulator 
CNIL90 fined Google for failure to conform on a global scale with the 
“right to be forgotten” as ruled by a 2014 ECJ judgment.91
In the US, libel chill has been addressed with passage of the 
SPEECH Act92 that renders unenforceable any foreign defamation 
judgment against US journalists unless they are consistent with US 
laws and procedures, including the First Amendment, section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act93 and US standards of due process.
In other words, foreign judgments must be “consistent with that 
which a US court would have reached on the facts, if the defamation 
The decision was overturned on appeal in Anderson v. Gannett Co., 994 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 
2008)).
87. Getting It Right, But in a “False Light,” REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/digital-journalists-legal-guide/
getting-it-right-false-light-0 (pointing out that some states hold that false light claims can 
concern untrue implications, not directly false statements). 
 88. Thereby offending the constitutional standard that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” (emphasis added). U.S. 
Const. amend. I. 
 89. David Mayer, Pokémon Go Maker Is Facing a Privacy Lawsuit Threat in Germany,
Fortune (July 20, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/20/pokemon-go-germany-privacy/.
 90. Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertes. Google argued it complied 
by scrubbing search results from its European subsidiaries (Google.fr and Google.de). 
 91. Kayla Haran, France Fines Google Over Global Right to be Forgotten, HARV.J. L. &
TECH (Apr. 4, 2016), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy/france-fines-google-over-global-
right-to-be-forgotten.
92. Supra, note 2. 
93. Supra, note 1. 
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had occurred in the United States.”94 Defamation is broadly defined in 
the SPEECH Act as “any action or other proceeding for defamation, 
libel, slander, or similar claim alleging that forms of speech are false, 
have caused damage to reputation or emotional distress, have 
presented any person in a false light, or have resulted in criticism, 
dishonor, or condemnation of any person.”95 The italicized inclusions 
harken to laws of insult in medieval Europe or present-day repressive 
regimes.96
Rules governing transatlantic export of personal data from EU 
countries by US Internet companies have changed considerably since 
the Schrems decision in 2015. With safe harbor agreements 
pronounced unconstitutional by the CJEU, the EU and US have had to 
build consensus regarding a workable balance between free speech 
and privacy rights for personal data transfers out of EU member 
states. The resulting self-certification Privacy Shield (IP/16/216) was 
signed in July of 2016 and governs all data flow of personal data from 
the EU to the US and particularly aims at commercial transactions 
between the two jurisdictions.97 Salient provisions include notification 
to data subjects by commercial participants of the use being made of 
their data including third party use; mechanisms the data subject can 
use to access that data; and ways that the US Department of 
Commerce will cooperate with EU data protection authorities to 
facilitate claims of non-compliance by data subjects. The principles 
that frame the Privacy Shield mirror those of the GDPR regarding 
consent, notification, data retention guidelines, and publication of 
non-compliance actions by the appropriate authorities. As of this 
writing, the agreement is undergoing review by the Article 29 privacy 
advocacy group in Europe and privacy specialists in the US. 
II. PRACTICAL HURDLES FOR PROSPECTIVE LITIGANTS
The Gordian knot metaphor suits the complex and often puzzling 
interplay of conceptual principles and practice outcomes in reputation 
 94. Emily C. Barbour, The SPEECH Act: The Federal Response to ‘Libel Tourism’,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Sept. 16, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41417.pdf.
95. Supra note 2, at § 4101(1).
 96. Ruth Walden, Insult Laws: An Insult to Press Freedom, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM
COMMITTEE (2000), http://www.wpfc.org/site/docs/pdf/Insult%20Laws-Text.PDF. 
 97. Passage of the Judicial Redress Act H.R.1428 - 114th Congress (2015-2016) was a 
pre-condition to the agreement; it grants EU citizens the right to enforce data protection rights in 
the U.S. a key stipulation of the EC negotiators. For details see Welcome to the EU0US Privacy 
Shield, https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome. 
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law. A layer of complexity is added to the mix by social media; it 
seems that features of the Internet that make it most attractive for 
every kind of informational exchange also contribute to a type of risk 
more permanent and severe than legacy journalism and what we used 
to call mass media. Those idiosyncrasies raise several legal and 
practical questions that call out for analysis. The following are key to 
reputational harm perpetrated online. 
A. Gradients of Harm & Other Issues of Proof 
It is the remedy that bridges the gap between the ideal and 
the real, or, rather, between norms and fact.98
Tort law holds promise for reputational redress due to its focus 
on harm to the plaintiff rather than wrongdoing by the defendant: it 
looks to liability, not blame. Historically libel damages were 
presumed, in recognition of the reputational stigma that the written 
word could compel. Today, that presumption has narrowed to 
defamation -per se (obvious defamation) cases.99 Beyond that, 
particularly in cases of innuendo or inducement, litigants must prove 
actual (or special) damages in order to recover.100
Innuendo can play a major part in social media defamation cases 
because the extrinsic facts it references add meaning to the truncated 
and fragmentary nature of tweets, emails or Facebook postings. That 
was illustrated in the 2013 London High Court case of Sally Bercow, 
wife of the current Speaker of the House of Commons in the United 
Kingdom who tweeted, “Why is Lord McAlpine trending? *innocent 
face,*” thereby implicating a former Conservative Member of 
Parliament. 101 The court found the contents were sufficient when 
combined with several other media accounts to link McAlpine to a 
child sex abuse scandal and so found for the plaintiff. The court 
 98. Helge Dedek, From Norms to Facts: Realization of Rights in Common and Civil 
Private Law, 56 MCGILL L. J. 77 (2010) (comparing the “lively” discourse in common law 
regarding converting rights to remedies to civil law jurisdictions where “the concept of remedy 
remains a mystery”.) 
99. Per se actions have historically been reserved for cases related to charges that a 
person has contracted a contagious or venereal disease; that a woman is of unchaste character; 
for other untrue statements that tend to injure a person in his profession, trade, or business; or 
accusations of crimes involving moral turpitude. 
100. See generally UK Defamation Act 2013 (2013 UK Act), Chapter 26 that sets out to 
rebalance, rather than rewrite, the common law of defamation. It sets the requisite standard of 
harm at serious damage, thereby weeding out more trivial cases, but also doing away with the 
presumption of reputational harm. The defendant retains the defense of truth, but s/he must prove 
a statement is substantially true.
 101. McAlpine v. Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB).
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reasoned that Bercow’s 56,000 Twitter followers, as well as a similar 
number of potential news subscribers, would comprehend the 
meaning of the “innocent face” (identified as a type of “stage 
direction or a emoticon” directing the reader to imagine that the 
expression on the tweeter’s face is “one of innocence. . .[indicating] 
she does not know the answer to the question.”)102 Sufficient extrinsic 
value was found in the concurrent coverage of the child sex scandal 
by radio and print media to render Bercow’s offending tweet as 
defamatory. 
The Bercow case exemplifies a few novel issues of proof raised 
by social media cases. The High Court found that average readers of 
the tweet would find its tone “insincere and ironical”, an observation 
that falls short of the traditional legal standard of falsehood of a 
defamatory statement but, in the instant case, contributed to evidence 
that found for the plaintiff.103 Further, Bercow’s reference to 
“trending” stories added to her liability by implicating her in several 
media reports produced at the same time. That finding assumes 
Twitter followers were necessarily aware of those news accounts and 
read them into Bercow’s tweet, rather than dismissing the message as 
an “unfathomable, twitter ‘in-joke’” as one source suggests.104 An 
ancillary question is whether Bercow is necessarily rendered a public 
figure with a finding of malice added to the list of evidentiary 
requirements, due to the extensive readership the Twitter medium 
attracts.105
Courts exhibit reticence to acknowledge a legal expectation of 
privacy when dealing with social media speech as can be seen in the 
US where the mere creation of a Facebook account disqualified a user 
from such claims,106 or a student’s posting of his poem on a MySpace 
account convinced a school principal of his right to hand over the 
student’s poem to the local newspaper for publication.107
Jurists and school personnel are not alone in their confusion over 
the privacy landscape for digital speech: users as well exhibit 
102. Id. per Mr. Justice Tugendhat, at § 7. 
103. Id. at § 84. 
 104. Hugh Tomlinson, Case Law: McAlpine v Bercow (No.2), Sally Bercow’s Tweet Was 
Defamatory, INFORRM’S BLOG (May 24, 2013), https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/05/24/case-
law-mcalpine-v-bercow-no-2-sally-bercows-tweet-was-defamatory-hugh-tomlinson-qc. 
 105. That question is posed with reference to US defamation law in Matthew Lafferman, 
Do Facebook and Twitter make you a Public Figure? How to Apply the Gertz Public Figure 
Doctrine to Social Media,” 29 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 199 (2012). 
106. See, e.g., Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S. 2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 107. Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel Inc., 172 Cal.App.4th. 1125, 1130 (2009).
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unfamiliarity with the scope of their audiences, as shown in US 
entertainer Courtney Love’s insistence that she believed her offending 
tweet was sent directly to one recipient, not to Twitter readers at 
large,108 or Sally Bercow’s argument that her Twitter followers 
numbering in the tens of thousands should not be calculated as 
including those who read general news reports. 
Another challenge is dealing with standards of proof for digital 
speech and wireless messaging tools with laws created for the era of 
wiretaps, radio and postcards.109 In legal terms, jurists’ cobbling of 
pre-Internet law onto digital speech cases has added to that confusion 
and led to more than a few awkward charges: for example, using 
trespass to chattels charges for email hacking,110 assault by Internet,111
and intentional infliction of emotional distress for overly expressive 
texts.112 One of the most gymnastic applications of common law 
causes of action to social media is use of breach of confidential 
relationship where no prior close relationship ever existed. The 
practice is routinely used in the UK and exemplified in the Max 
Mosley case (discussed below).113 It signals a need for better 
understanding of both technological capabilities of the medium and 
the ontological uniqueness of digital speech. 
The view that novel media might require discrete legal solutions 
can be seen in arguments of the defense team of US entertainer 
Courtney Love, as discussed above. Love had tweeted to a very large 
fan base that Mafia members had placed illegal influence on her 
former lawyer. In America’s first “twibel” case, the defense proposed 
that it is the nature of tweets to use “hyperbole and exaggeration” that 
are not to be scrutinized too carefully or taken as carrying deeper 
meaning.114  In asking that claims made via Twitter not be held to the 
 108. Corina Knoll, Singer-actress Courtney Love wins landmark Twitter libel case, LA 
Times (Jan. 24, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/24/local/la-me-love-libel-20140125. 
 109. For commentary on cultural differences regarding expectations of privacy for 
postcards, see also Steven D. Zansberg & Janna K, Fisscher, Privacy Expectations in Online 
Social Media - An Emerging Generational Divide?, Communications Lawyer (Nov. 20, 2011), 
http://www.lskslaw.com/documents/evolvingprivacyexpectations(00458267).pdf. 
 110. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1347 (2003).  
 111. Marquez v. Reyes, Civil Action No. 10-cv-01281-BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
65701 (D. Colo. June 10, 2010). 
 112. Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMS and E-Mails: Can A 
Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 23 (2010). 
 113. Mosley, infra at 122. 
 114. As referenced in Patrick H. Hunt, Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying 
Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 LA. L. REV. 559, 560 nn.13-14 (2013).
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same legal standards as speech used by offline news organizations, 
Love’s counsel were suggesting that the law of defamation shift to 
create a lesser category of speech with less stringent publishing 
standards when digital media are used, particularly given its 
unmediated status.115 
Traditional remedies also provide a challenge in that they might 
prove impractical for digital speech cases where the majority of 
defendants are citizen journalists without deep pockets. In a pre-
Internet study, the most sought-after defamation remedy was 
pecuniary,116 even though plaintiffs admitted to its lack of 
effectiveness in meeting litigants’ expectations.117 The damage award 
for super model Naomi Campbell, for example, after several years of 
litigation in three levels of court and a widening circle of negative 
publicity, was a nominal £3,500.118 By 2010, however, an Iowa study 
reported that the preferred solution was retractions, a possible 
reflection of social media users’ realization that much wider 
audiences would access an online retraction or apology notice than 
when traditional media are used. Internet scholar David Ardia also 
points to the deterrence provided by the growing capricious nature of 
damage awards on both sides of the Atlantic.119 Other recent remedies 
for defamation have included containment through injunctions120 and 
erasure mechanisms contained in some US and EU laws promoting le
droit l’oubli, a personal right to be forgotten. 
115. See Hunt, supra note 114, 559 passim (arguing that Twitter is a revolutionary 
communications platform in that it enables, for the first time in modern communications, 
participation of the average citizen with celebrities, major news networks, and politicians). 
 116. Damage awards are customarily allocated in two categories, compensatory (or actual) 
damages and punitive damages (known as exemplary damages in Cyprus, England and Wales 
where they are extremely rare). There are other modifying terms placed in front of the word 
damages like “liquidated damages,” (contractually established damages) and “nominal 
damages” (where the court sets a figure to reprimand the defendant, such as awards of one 
dollar).
 117. Randall Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record 
Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 227 (1985). 
 118. Campbell v. MGN Ltd, [2004] UKHL 22, [14] (Eng.), 2 A.C. 457. 
 119. David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations 
of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. CIV. RTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2010). In the US, large 
damages continue to be awarded to a small number of plaintiffs. 
 120. David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 4 (2013) Note 15 (reporting that of fifty-six decisions involving injunctive relief in US 
defamation cases well over half were found to have been delivered since 2000 and over half by 
separate calculation, involved Internet speech. As well, the nature of injunctive relief awarded 
has been either disproportionate to the harm threatened or technologically infeasible). 
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The erasure remedy is highly controversial within the common 
law world as it represents a category of solutions that pose 
technological difficulties when dealing with online content. 121  In the 
Lord McAlpine case, above, the British peer sought damages against 
a number of “high profile Tweeters,” identified as users with more 
than 500 followers, who retweeted Bercow’s message, thereby 
enabling further third party dissemination of the original message.  
The anonymity of many citizen journalists would pose a further 
impediment to such remedies. 
Calculating a gradient of harm for different ways to offend 
reputational privacy online is a complex undertaking: how does one 
prove damages given the uber accessibility, archiving capabilities and 
ongoing third party dissemination capabilities afforded by social 
media technologies? Nonetheless, some high profile figures have 
pursued litigation and have attempted to articulate damages and the 
further harm to reputation they or their families have suffered as a 
result of going to court. For example, wealthy lawyer and auto racing 
figure Max Mosley, the subject of online dissemination of images by 
News of the World in a fictitious media story of a Nazi-themed sex 
party,122 spoke of “enormous and continuous damage”123 that became 
“totally devastating” for his wife of 48 years and his sons for whom 
he could think of “nothing more undignified or humiliating.”124 
Although successful in the originating jurisdiction, Mosley then faced 
mirror actions in 22 countries due to the replicative nature of online 
content, and at great personal cost. 
Similar issues faced American single mother Lorraine Martin 
who sought enforcement of a Connecticut erasure law for arrest news 
of criminal charges against her that were ultimately withdrawn. She 
describes the nightmarish realities of job searching in the shadow of 
such headlines as “Mother and sons charged with drug offenses.”125
As well, plaintiff Gonzales in the Google Spain case, discussed 
further below, found employment and social opportunities were 
 121. Bill Keller, Erasing History, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 28, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/opinion/keller-erasing-history.html?_r=0.
 122. Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC 687 (QB). 
123. Max Mosley Wins His Case Against Google in France, COLLYERBRISTOW.COM
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.collyerbristow.com/news/press-release-max-mosley-wins-his-case-
against-google-in-france.
124. Mosley Wins Court Case Over Orgy, BBC NEWS (July 24, 2008), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7523034.stm. Mosley also spoke of his elder son’s suicide during 
proceedings.
 125. Keller, supra note 121. 
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denied him due to persistent online accounts of his previous debt to 
social services authorities that cropped up each time he Googled his 
name.
One source cites the disparities in litigation outcomes as proof of 
need for a more contextual or nuanced approach: “common law courts 
attach extremely divergent legal consequences to impugned 
statements based on indefensibly broad generalizations about the 
degree of danger to personal reputation posed by the medium in 
which the statement was communicated.”126
B. Jurisdiction & Choice of Law
Personality rights have been described as one of the most 
contentious areas of private international law127 in that the instant 
personal data or defamatory content crosses national borders the issue 
of a multistate conflict of laws arises.128 Such magnified exposure 
creates two immediate legal decisions for a plaintiff: where to sue and 
under which law. For those who find their privacy exposed by 
unauthorized use of their personal data, those questions are not easily 
answered. For EU victims, national data protection agencies are the 
first step, with subsequent judicial review provided by the CJEU; for 
US victims, the answer involves a sector-by-sector review of 
available legal remedies.129
Given the unique architecture of Internet communications, such 
reputational harm now crosses borders widely, instantaneously and 
far more frequently. That activity brings the non-European website 
operator within the four corners of two EU legal instruments: the 
 126. Robert Danay, The Medium is not the Message: Reconciling Reputation and Free 
Expression in Cases of Internet Defamation, 56:1 MCGILL L.J. 1, 1 (2010).
 127. Csongor Istvan Nagy, The Word is a Dangerous Weapon: Jurisdiction, Applicable 
Law and Personality Rights in EU Law – Missed and New Opportunities, 8 J. PRIVATE INT’L. L.,
251, 253 (2012). 
128. See also Tamas Dezlo Czigler, Choice of Law in the Internet Age: US and European 
Rules, 53 HUNGARIAN J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (2012). 
 129. For example, the national Privacy Act, 1974 could be invoked for privacy breaches 
caused by federal civil servants; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1986 updates the 
Federal Wiretap Act of 1968, addressing concerns originating over wiretapping but now 
extended to protect wire, oral, and electronic communications; children’s personal data exposure 
could involve the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA); and the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) addresses health data breaches by federal 
employees.
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Brussels I Regulation130 (Brussels I, governing the jurisdiction for 
hearing transborder civil matters) and the Rome II Regulation131
(Rome II, addressing the choice of laws that will apply to non-
contractual obligations). The third instrument, the E-Commerce 
Directive, is also involved in data transfer as it addresses publication 
of information on the Internet, particularly the issue of whether an ISP 
functions as a “mere conduit” or a controller of such information. 
What becomes important under Brussels I is not the location or 
domicile of the plaintiff but that of the defendant and, due to the 
variety of recognized exemptions, the geo-location where harm is 
experienced.132
With respect to reputational disputes, Rome II has been a most 
anticipated mechanism for clarifying “all matters relating to privacy 
and personality rights, including defamation.”133 It marks an effort by 
the EU to coordinate judicial decision-making regarding the import 
and export of online information of citizens within its member states. 
Such harmonization could reduce or eliminate forum shopping for 
plaintiffs. 
Unfortunately for legal clarity and predictability, defamation law 
is not included in the provisions of Rome II at present, withdrawn at 
the eleventh hour due to a flood of protest from the publishing 
industry as well as a lack of consensus between the European 
Commission and the Council of Europe.134 Negotiations continue.135
Brussels I, with provisions addressing non-contractual conflicts 
involving torts and including the media, holds that jurisdiction is to be 
 130. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J. (L 012) 
[hereinafter Brussels I]. 
 131. Council Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the Law Applicable to 
Non-contractual Obligations, O.J. (L 199/40) [hereinafter Rome II].
 132. For a more detailed analysis of Brussels I, see The Brussels I Regulation (No 44/
2001), Ch. 1, DUTCH CIVIL LAW, http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/content/brusselsone011.htm 
(last visited April 8, 2016). 
 133. On July 11, 2007 the European Parliament and the Council adopted the ‘Rome II’ 
Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 40). 
Under Article 1(2)(g), ‘non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights 
relating to personality, including’ are excluded from the Regulation’s scope. 
 134. Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II and Tort Conflicts: Missed Opportunities, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 173 (2008).
 135. Jan-Jaap Kuipers, Towards a European Approach in the Cross-Border Infringement 
of Personality Rights, 12 GERM. L. J. 1681, 1697 (2011), (describing thirteen options for 
violations of privacy and personality rights discussed in preparatory meetings of the Rome II 
committee).
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exercised by the EU country in which the defendant is domiciled, 
regardless of his/her nationality.136 In the case of legal persons, 
domicile is the country where they have their central administration or 
principal place of business. For Google Inc., for example, domicile 
could be Mountain View, California but if the suit involves an 
individual plaintiff domiciled in France, the matter could involve 
Google France and hence a French court. Brussels I also provides that 
jurisdiction can be determined by the “place where the harmful event 
occurred.”137 That provision complicates the issue by creating a 
number of possibilities along the chain of causation. In the German 
case of Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, the CJEU interpreted 
that clause to mean either the domicile of the defendant who posted 
the defamatory content or the domicile of the plaintiff who suffered 
the resulting publicity.138 That interpretation was made in pre-Internet 
days, however, when points along the causal chain were more easily 
identified.139
More recently, the CJEU took the opportunity to address the 
“Gordian knot” that the jurisdiction and choice of law issues have 
become in defamation and invasion of privacy cases with the enjoined 
Internet cases eDate Advertising and Oliver Martinez.140 The 
claimants alleged that their personality rights had been infringed as a 
result of online publications on websites that were based in different 
EU Member States than those in which they lived. In eDate
Advertising, the plaintiff was a German national and resident that had 
been convicted of murdering a well-known actor in 1993 and released 
on parole in 2008.141 He complained that the Austrian website 
publisher eDate Advertising, infringed his personality rights by 
reporting his full name, conviction for murder, and the fact that he 
 136. Brussels I, supra note 132, at art. 2. 
137. Id. at art. 5(3) for all torts (non-contractual matters).
 138. Case 21/76, Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace, 1976 E.C.R. 1735 [BIER]. See
generally Nagy, supra note 127. 
 139. The Bier issues were revisited in 1996 CJEU cases of Shevill v Presse Alliance SA.
See Case C-68/93, Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint 
International Ltd v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995 E.C.R. I-415 (determining that harm occurs where 
the defamatory material is accessed or read (offline newspapers in this case), not where the 
publisher is headquartered or where the plaintiff is located when discovering the offending 
content).
 140. Joined Cases C-509/09 & C-161/10, eDate Advertising v. X and Olivier Martinez & 
Robert Martinez v. MGN Limited, 2011 E.C.R. I-10269. 
141. Id.
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was appealing his conviction.142 The Bundesgerichtshof or Federal 
Court of Justice for Germany asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling 
on the applicability of Brussels I regarding jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters143 as well 
as the e-Commerce Directive relating to matters of tort published on 
the Internet.144
In the companion case Martinez, the French actor Olivier 
Martinez complained of an infringement of his privacy and of the 
right to his image by the UK-based Sunday Mirror website in an 
article entitled”Kylie Minogue back with Olivier Martinez.” The 
online coverage used a dated photograph to erroneously suggest 
Martinez had reunited with a former girlfriend.145 Domestic courts 
faced arguments from the commercial defendants that the court did 
not possess authority to make orders restricting publication outside 
their jurisdictions. 
The CJEU confirmed for both cases that infringement of 
personality rights by Internet can be litigated either in the EU 
Member State where the publisher is established or where the 
plaintiff’s “centre of interests” is based, a finding that did not bring 
clarity to existing law.146 The decision acknowledged that the law of 
conflict might not be of much assistance within the unique context of 
Internet communications because Internet distribution is “universal,” 
“intended. . .to ensure the ubiquity of that content,” and calls into 
question the whole “centre of interests” concept.147
The decision in eDate Advertising and Oliver Martinez 
acknowledges the borderless nature of the Internet but does little to 
simplify the law for its extraterritorial transmission of data; it 
underscores the need for innovative thinking when it comes to online 
behavior.
C.  The Half Life Debate 
Much literature addressing new media communications has us 
believing that reputation-damaging postings are permanent or at least 
 142. Nagy, supra note 127, at 252-253 (acknowledging that personality rights and privacy 
are much broader concepts than libel and defamation and might cover, for example, the right to 
human dignity, bodily integrity, and private communications). 
143. Id. at note 43. 
144. Id. at note 28. 
 145. eDate Advertising, supra note 140.
146. Id. at § 48. 
147. Id. 
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highly persistent and accessible.148 The “right to be forgotten” raised 
by the European Commission in the context of both extant and 
pending data protection legislation advocates recognition of a human 
right to delete personally damning content and past social mistakes 
that pervade online spaces with an “iron memory.”149 The concept can 
be seen as both “intuitive and widely appreciated” in European 
thinking and lawmaking;150 so too in America, given the ethos of 
second chances from which the new nation was forged.151 Hence there 
is potential for deeper and more enduring harm than with offline 
defamatory statements because of protracted access to personal data 
by an expanded audience.  Internet users, particularly young ones, 
receive ample warnings of the permanence of online memory from 
industry, educators, and family.152 Bert-Jaap Koops warns of 
apprehension or that “distinct feeling of unease” provoked when 
suddenly data from the past re-emerges in unexpected contexts.153
In contrast, several digital-savvy scholars maintain that online 
content is short-lived. They speak of the evanescence of texting and 
SNS communications, a concept that “eases the force of a blow” of 
defamation.154 Among proponents of the half-life debate is Harvard 
history scholar Jill Lepore who assesses the Web as ethereal, unstable 
and unreliable. She cites two studies that offer empirical proof of the 
transience of online academic sources. In the first, a 2013 survey of 
legal policy-related journals identified a near-fifty percent loss in 
workable URLs over six years.155 The second study, at Harvard Law 
School, found over 70% loss of URLs cited in the Harvard Law 
Review and other journal articles, as well as a 50% attrition of URLs 
within US Supreme court opinions. Lepore notes the frequency with 
which the error message “Page not Found” is the result of our online 
search efforts and concludes, “[s]ocial media, public records, junk: in 
148. See also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 8 (2004) . 
 149. Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of 
the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ in Big Data Practice’ 8 SCRIPTed 1 (2011). 
150. Id. at 2. 
 151. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY passim (2007).
 152. Mike Lata, Snapchat Tells FTC That Your Private Photos Never Actually Got 
Deleted, TECHTIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/6853/20140512/
snapchat-image-sharing-images-photos-videos-fcc-privacy-online-privacy.htm.
 153. Koops supra, note 149, at 2. 
 154. Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457 (2012). 
 155. Jill Lepore, The Cobweb: Can the Internet Be Archived? THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 26, 
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/cobweb. 
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the end, everything goes.”156 Both of those studies relate half-life to 
the amount of time that content remains accessible and functionally 
useful while online. 
Also promoting an evaporation theory are computer engineers 
Daniel Gomes and Maroi Silvia. Their 2006 study suggests that, in 
that year, just over half (55%) of content remained online after one 
day, 41% after a week, 23% after 100 days, and 15% after a year.157
Meg Angelo of Georgetown University in turn suggests that 
“information is not permanent, no matter the medium” and calls for 
principled information storage practices.158 She attributes 
disappearing content more to technological malfunctions such as 
media and hardware errors, software failures, network service 
failures, component obsolescence, operator errors, natural disasters, 
internal and external attacks, and organizational failures.159 In the end, 
the half-life debate is of little comfort to reputational privacy victims 
whose exposure endures long after their usefulness or authorization 
has expired.160
D.  The Attribution Problem 
Attribution can be defined as the identification of users or data 
subjects through their online data. Anonymity defeats attribution 
attempts. Identifying who comprises the plaintiff’s online community 
is algorithmically challenging with the use of widespread anonymity 
and third party dissemination.161 Messages and images are accessed 
by persons who never have, or probably never will, meet the plaintiff 
or speak the same language. That open availability of content is 
assisted by permanent archiving capabilities and low entry costs of 
the medium. 
Anonymity is used for two principal reasons, to protect the 
privacy of the data subject and to avoid responsibility for one’s online 
behavior. Our vulnerability to invasive technology at the hands of the 
156. Id. 
 157. Daniel Gomes & Mario J. Silvia, Modeling Information Persistence on the Web,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE VI INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEB ENGINEERING, 1 (2006). 
 158. Megan Angelo, You Are What Google Says You Are, WIRED (November 2, 2009), 
http://www.wired.com/business/2009/02/you-are-what-go/.
159. Id. 
 160. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317 [hereinafter Google Spain] (reporting the 
offending news account remained online for 16 years before the CJEU ordered it removed). 
161. See generally Amy Kristin Sanders, Defining Defamation: Community in the Age of 
the Internet, 53 COMM. L. & POL’Y 231 (2010). 
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state is accelerating at an alarming pace in the digital era. Through 
use of deanonymizing technology and the combination of seemingly 
discrete bits of information,162 data analysts can pierce the public/
private divide we believe we enjoy as citizens of a democratic state. 
For example, we have been told that our gender and sexual 
preferences can now be ascertained from a mere examination of our 
use of the “like” function on Facebook.163  Similarly we have been 
alerted that we are only four mobile phone conversations away from 
government identification.164
In addition to increasing surveillance capabilities of many 
governments, we are learning that much personal data sold to 
commercial advertisers is not anonymized before being sold.165 The 
degree of anonymizing becomes a critical factor in determining what 
is “personal data,” “personally identified information,” or “personally 
identifiable information” when constructing privacy or data protection 
legislation.166 Those definitions, and hence the type of data that is 
regulated, differ from one country to the next, making consensus on 
privacy standards and anonymity a complex objective. 
E.  Legal Immunity of ISPs 
1.  The Communications Decency Act Meets Google Spain 
Legislative and judicial treatment differs on each side of the 
Atlantic regarding the legal accountability of ISPs for harmful content 
they distribute or invasive data retention practices they employ.167 In 
 162. Daniel Solove, Justice Scalia’s Dossier: Interesting Issues About Privacy and Ethics,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (April 29, 2009), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/
04/justice_scalias_2.html.
 163. Rebecca J. Rosen, Armed with Facebook ‘Likes” Alone, Researchers Can Tell Your 
Race Gender and Sexual Orientation, THE ATLANTIC (March 12, 2013), http://
www.theAtlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/03/armed-with-facebook-likes-alone-
researchers-can-tell-your-race-gender-and-sexual-orientation/273963/.
 164. Matt Warman, Online Anonymity: Impossible After Four Phone Calls, THE
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9952841/Online-
anonymity-impossible-after-four-phone-calls.html.
165. See also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (holding that a Vermont 
statute that restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of records that revealed the prescribing 
practices of individual doctors violated the First Amendment). 
 166. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel L. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept 
of Personally Identifiable Information, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011). 
 167. This area of law is in flux in both the US and EU, generating a large body of litigation 
for the courts and government watchdogs such as the Federal Communications Committee in 
America and the International Telecommunications Union in Europe. US Internet service 
providers maintain either that their role is as intermediary between those who post the content 
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Europe, the ECHR provides the doctrinal basis for protection of 
personal privacy and the sanctity of family life; human rights case law 
applies those principles as adjudicated by the ECtHR. EU data 
privacy regulation and policies, such as detailed in GDPR, require 
data controllers to provide data subjects with unambiguous notice of 
what information is being collected, why it is gathered, and who will 
be able to access it. Those laws inform domestic law in each EU 
Member State, although front line decisions regarding ISPs rest in the 
hands of national data protection agencies. 
The European formal position, then, is that operations of Internet 
companies that involve their citizens be subject to rigorous laws of 
anti-competition, data protection, and content liability. The Google
Spain decision identified ISPs and Internet content hosts as 
controllers of content with legal liability and pro-active 
responsibilities regarding privacy-sensitive content. 
US judges are far less likely than their European counterparts to 
find Internet companies or ISPs liable for the hosting and distribution 
of defamatory content due to First Amendment protections and the 
sweeping immunity afforded by the Communications Decency Act. 
Section 230 of that law provides that “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”168
Such wording broadly exempts from liability any linking or 
other exchange of online content between service providers, leaving 
the regulation of online privacy to individual users through “click-
wrap agreements.”169 Those contracts, unwieldy in length and 
complexity, grant individual access to websites and applications and 
hence various Internet content. Their terms are non-negotiable from 
(publisher) and the subject of the content (individual user), or that they are data processors under 
an agency arrangement with the publisher. EU data regulations define a processor as a “separate 
legal entity with respect to the controller who process [sic] personal data on his behalf” while a
controller is any body that “determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data.”  Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts of “Controller” and “Processor,” Working Party 
Document 169, ARTICLE 29, DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY (Feb. 16, 2010), available
at  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/index_en.htm.
168. Supra note 1. 
 169. The compulsory clicking of “I agree” to terms of service in order to access a 
particular site or service. See also Ryan J. Casamiquela, Contractual Assent and Enforceability: 
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 475, 475–76 (2002) (detailing numerous contract court 
decisions from the 1990s and early 2000s). See Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S. Brown, Limited
Consumer Privacy Protections Against the Layers of Big Data, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 483 passim (2015).
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the user’s perspective. Unacceptable terms can be dealt with by non-
participation in the service or registering complaints with the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) about deceptive practices. Although the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the other major US 
agency involved in the regulation of online activities, embarked upon 
a strategy in 2015 to centralize requirements for ISPs regarding Do 
Not Track mechanisms, industry response has been uneven and self-
regulation remains the business practice for now.170
More broadly, US privacy law is regulated through sector-
specific federal and state laws. Consequently, a consent-based regime 
links users to primary parties but does little to reveal subsequent use 
of their data and what that consent truly entails.171 The Matthew 
Drudge case illustrates that even active participation by an ISP can 
garner protection within US jurisprudence. 
Matthew Drudge is an Internet gossip columnist,172 most noted 
for breaking the President Clinton-Monica Lewinski story. He was 
contracted to America On-Line (AOL) for a series of news stories he 
posted on an AOL enabled website that were distributed by email to 
subscribers. The Drudge Report promoted itself as a particular species 
of new media: a US-based “news aggregator.”173 The AOL, as ISP for 
those columns, had the right to remove content under its standard 
terms of service, and arguably could be considered an editor or 
controller of content for its active involvement in the selection of 
material to publish. Drudge posted the gossipy content, which 
provided links to other articles and sources of news. In one such story 
Drudge reported domestic abuse by Sidney Blumenthal, a prominent 
member of President Clinton’s administration.174 Blumenthal sued 
both Drudge and AOL for defamation. By invoking section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act and disavowing any activities as 
 170. In general, the FCC oversees Internet infrastructure while the FTC regulates content. 
There is some confusion of roles when dealing with net neutrality. 
 171. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).
 172. The Drudge Report provided links to upcoming political and entertainment stories 
and “predicted” various public sector scandals. 
 173. Kaley Leetaru, New Media vs. Old Media: A Portrait of The Drudge Report 2002-
2008, FIRST MONDAY (July 6, 2009), http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2500/
2235 (arguing that the Drudge Report relied heavily on wire services and obscure news outlets 
to find small stories that would break large in future days, making it highly dependent on 
mainstream “old media” sites). 
 174. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C.C. 1998). 
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publisher, AOL was successfully removed as a defendant, despite its 
input to content and the editorial oversight it provided. 
While the appellate court questioned the carte blanche extended
to ISPs under the Communications Decency Act and berated their
freedom to “flaunt a rumormonger’s ability to make rumors instantly 
accessible to its subscribers and then claim immunity,” the court 
upheld the originating court’s decision all the same.175
The Communications Decency Act was originally introduced to 
combat youth-directed pornographic content on the Internet.176
Criticism of the generous ambit of section 230 grows with the wide 
berth it affords ISPs.177 Free speech proponents continue, however, to 
praise the legislation as the vanguard of Internet liberalism and non-
curated content, such as that produced by citizen journalists.178
EU law has generally taken a stricter view of liability for ISPs 
than that of the US. Under the Technical Standards Directive, a 
“service provider” for purposes of establishing liability is defined as 
any person or entity providing an “information society service” which 
means any services offered for remuneration at a distance by 
electronic means.179 Similarly, the eCommerce Directive affords an 
ISP immunity from liability only when it serves as a “mere 
conduit”180 or provides “temporary caching”181 for the sole purpose of 
making the transmission of content more efficient. The Directive is 
175. Id. at 51. 
 176. Nebraska Senator Exon proposed the original draft of the CDA in the mid-1990s. See
Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: 
Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1996).
177. See also JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY ACT: A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND REFORM PROPOSALS, CENTER ON 
LAW AND INFORMATION POLICY REPORT (CLIP) FORDHAM UNIVERSITY (Apr. 25, 2012); Ryan
Dyer, The Communication Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case for Renewing the Presumption 
Against Preemption, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 837 (2014); Sheri Wardwell, Communications 
Decency Act Provides No Safe Harbor Against Antifraud Liability for Hyperlinks to Third Party 
Content Under the Securities And Exchange Act, 6 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 49 (2010). 
178. See, e.g., Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: The Most Important Law 
Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/
cda230 (promoting § 230 as sound legal policy allowing for “YouTube and Vimeo users to 
upload their own videos, Amazon and Yelp to offer countless user reviews, craigslist to host 
classified ads, and Facebook and Twitter to offer social networking to hundreds of millions of 
Internet users”). 
 179. Directive Laying Down a Procedure for the Provision of Information in the Field of 
Technical Standards and Regulations (EC) No. 98/34 of 22 June 1998, art. 1(2), 1998 O.J. (L 
204).
180. e-Commerce Directive, supra note 64, art. 12. 
181. Id. at art. 3. 
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used in cases of copyright infringement, defamation, and invasion of 
privacy. Immunity is also provided if the ISP service is of a mere 
technical, automatic and passive nature, and where the ISP has no 
actual knowledge or control over the content being transmitted or 
stored.182
Personal data retention by telecom service providers is regulated 
under a separate ePrivacy Directive.183 Such laws requiring the 
retention for government purposes of location and traffic data of 
individual users were found to violate the ECHR in 2014.184 As a 
result, service providers now have a legal basis on which to refuse 
compliance with national data retention obligations, although the 
decision is unclear as to which remedies are available to individual 
users whose personal data is disclosed. It is difficult to imagine such 
restriction on government surveillance practices in America. 
The individual right to seek takedown requests from ISPs, and to 
have them give serious consideration to those requests, is of particular 
interest to courts in Europe.185 An often-cited example involves the 
conviction for invasion of privacy and defamation of three Google 
executives at the hands of a Milan court of first instance in 2010. 
Residents of a small Italian town complained that a YouTube video of 
schoolmates taunting an autistic student lingered online for a couple 
of weeks before Google administration removed it.186 The Milan court 
found that that period of time allowed extensive access by countless 
online viewers. Google argued a guilty verdict might require it to 
filter content on all YouTube videos before they was posted, which it 
claimed would be incompatible with the spirit of an open Internet as 
well as the tenor of several European directives and guidelines. The 
executives were given a suspended sentence and fine.187  On appeal 
the “mere conduit” defense of the Google executives was accepted 
and the convictions overturned.188
182. Id. at art. 42. As affirmed in the CJEU decision of Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended 
SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2012 E.C.R. 4. 
 183. Eprivacy Directive, supra note 66. 
 184. Digital Rights Ireland, supra note 67.
 185. As reflected in the “right to be forgotten” proposed by the GDPR and detailed in the 
CJEU reference decision, supra note 160. 
 186. Loek Essers, Google Video Trial to Continue to Italian Supreme Court, PCWORLD
(April 17, 2013), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2035387/google-video-trial-to-continue-to-
italian-supreme-court.html. Google Inc. purchased YouTube on  Nov. 13, 2006. 
 187. Privacy actions are addressed through the criminal law in Italy. 
 188. Bogdan, Italian Supreme Court: Google’s YouTube is just a hosting provider, EDRI
(Feb. 12, 2014), https://edri.org/italian-supreme-court-search-engines-just-hosting-providers/. 
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The more clear-cut intercontinental differences between 
European and American legal treatment of ISPs are beginning to blur. 
With the long-awaited Google Spain decision, the CJEU advanced the 
autonomy of users and data subjects in two significant ways: it judged 
Internet companies to be “controllers” of data information involving 
EU citizens; and it granted those citizens unprecedented autonomy 
regarding the collection, processing, leakage, and mobility of that 
information. Prior take-down requests had been limited to information 
deemed illegal by a court, such as in defamation, privacy or breach of 
confidentiality cases, pirated content, malware, child sexual abuse 
imagery and other content prohibited by local law such as material 
that glorifiesNazism in France.189
Control of the individual over her personal information was 
limited in other ways before Google Spain. People were not notified 
of which data identifying them was being collected, profiled, or 
shared with other institutional or commercial third parties. Such 
activities increased individual risk of hacking, loss, negligent 
handling, or other activities that jeopardized their privacy. If leaks, 
exposure or loss occurred, there was little legal compensation offered 
the data subject. That lack of transparency hid the extent and 
acceleration of the exposure problem: an IBM study in 2013 revealed 
that globally “more than half a billion records of personally 
identifiable information—including names, emails, credit card 
numbers and passwords—were stolen.”190
2.  Terms Of Service Meet Schrems v Facebook
The 2014 reference case of Maximillian Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner of Ireland involved a challenge to routine 
exportation of the Austrian law student’s Facebook data from Ireland 
(where subscriber data of many Internet companies resides) to the US 
(the corporate headquarters of such technology giants). Many 
postings were of a very personal nature.191 The CJEU ruled as 
 189. David Drummond, We Need to Talk About the Right to be Forgotten, THE GUARDIAN
(July 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-
european-ruling-google-debate (setting out formal criteria according to the UK Google head).
 190. IBM Security Services 2014 Cyber Security Intelligence Index (June 2014, https://
media.scmagazine.com/documents/82/ibm_cyber_security_intelligenc_20450.pdf. 
 191. “[E]very ‘poke’, friend request and invitation (and response) he had sent since setting 
up an account in 2008” according to Robert Levine, Behind the European Privacy Ruling that’s 
confounding Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015),  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/
business/international/behind-the-european-privacy-ruling-thats-confounding-silicon-
valley.html?_r=0.
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unconstitutional the EU-US Safe Harbor agreement enabling cross-
border transfer of EU citizens’ data as it did not meet privacy 
protection as required by EU fundamental rights legislation.192
Schrems pointed as proof to the 2013 revelations of Edward Snowden 
concerning the surveillance activities of the US intelligence services 
focusing on EU citizens. 
On the American side of the Atlantic, such activities might be 
scrutinized for First Amendment violations but otherwise are 
considered a matter of individual freedom of contract and self-
regulation through subscribers’ privacy settings. Facebook defended 
its broadly based terms of service that license the social media 
company to use subscribers’ content in any way it sees fit: for 
example, Facebook can transfer or sub-license its rights over a user’s 
content to another company or organization and all such uses continue 
after the deactivation or deletion of a user’s account. Facebook loses 
this license only once all other users that have interacted with the 
content have also deactivated their accounts. 
The case highlights the heightening tension between the 
libertarian values promoted by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and EU 
regulators who focus on the regulation of privacy as a human right. In 
the wake of the CJEU reference case, Schrems suggests three options 
for Facebook, Google and other implicated US companies: “moving 
data to Europe, encrypting data that is stored in the United States or 
reviewing the corporate structure.”193
III. TREATING DIGITAL SPEECH DIFFERENTLY
Of increasing promise for addressing reputational protections are 
extra-legal activities such as the ad hoc assemblage of online 
communities to lobby for user interests whenever unilateral actions by 
companies or governments threaten online privacy. Another emerging 
practice is that of online review and ranking systems where positive 
accomplishments or services of individuals can be promoted and false 
claims can be unearthed. This section briefly canvasses both a more 
formal adjudicatory two-tiered system addressing social media harms 
to reputation and extra-legal suggestions. 
192. Schrems, supra note 60.
193. Data Protection Authorities in Ireland, Belgium and Germany requested to review 
and suspend Facebook’s data transfers over US spy programs, EUROPE V. FACEBOOK (Dec. 2, 
2015), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/prism2_en.pdf. 
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A.  The Speech Conundrum & A Separate Space 
The democratization of online communications has produced 
spontaneous, a-contextual and unmediated speech – environmental 
factors that some argue merit less weight and meaning in legal 
terms.194 That debate raises the judicial practice of discerning “high” 
from “low” speech.195 Discussions of high level speech that is well 
researched and aimed at a broad audience, as distinguished from low 
level speech that is more amateurish, spontaneous and conversational, 
suggest a value-laden gradient of social good. If we were to debate 
the value of messages via new media such as video blogging, 
podcasts, or texting where content can be more off the cuff, 
fragmented or emotional, we might argue the content has less social 
currency because it is of little public interest.196 We could suggest that 
fewer constitutional protections would be justified regarding such 
speech because it comprises the daily back-and-forth of minutiae, 
humor, hyperbole and commentary. We could leave the more 
egregious, hurtful or inflammatory examples for penal treatment 
under the criminal law, with its elevated standards of proof. 
Rowbottom suggests it is only with the “persistence and searchability 
of digital messaging” that the scrutiny of prosecutors and litigators 
becomes involved.197 He concludes, however, that such amateur and 
casual speech merits some legal response and in proportion to the 
harm inflicted. 
Internet scholar Yuval Karniel supports a different view: that a 
rumor or other offhand comment does not have elevated status just 
because it is online: its reliability is still “restrained and 
incomplete.”198 The credibility of sources, so critical to public 
acceptance of traditional media accounts, is often suppressed or 
absent in online accounts. Cues about authority and status of either 
the writer or sources are often hidden or absent. As one psychological 
study of Internet behavior points out, in cyberspace what mostly 
 194. Yuval Karniel, Defamation on the Internet: A New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace,
2 J. INT’L MED. & ENT. L. 215, 219 (2009). 
195. See further, Jacob Rowbottom, To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level 
Digital Speech 71 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 355, 367 (2012) (for a UK perspective). 
 196. That is the approach of European courts in cases involving freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 197. Rowbottom, supra note 195, at 366. 
 198. Karniel, supra note 194, at 231. 
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influences listeners is the speaker’s skill in communicating coupled 
with “persistence, creative ideas and technical know-how.”199
David Mangan suggests digital speech should be a qualified 
social good, dependent on our responsible participation in the digital 
conversation.200 We already allot different values to various kinds of 
speech, such as the positive contributions of political speech and 
speech appearing in legacy journalism. He urges us to rein in the 
expansive berth that defamation law has allotted to free speech now 
that social media speech is challenging the status quo.
Criminal and civil court remedies involve so many features that 
argue against using traditional litigation for online speech: cost, 
delays, uncertainty of outcome, mandatory criminal sanctions. It 
would be worthwhile, then, to consider starting with the premise that, 
outside of egregious threats of harm warranting immediate police 
attention, digital speech has no social value at all, save those of 
venting or conveying subjective impressions, banal messages, 
opinions, gossip or innuendo. 
Legal actors struggle with how to define and measure the effects 
of digital speech on others. Internet defamation researcher Lyrissa 
Lidsky notes it occurs in a space where hyperbole and exaggeration 
are routine and venting is as commonplace as careful and considered 
argumentation.201 She concludes it is the side-by-side existence of 
both styles of speech in online communications reporting that creates 
uncertainty about the verifiability of digital speech.202
One argument for treating digital speech as a discrete species of 
communication is that Internet content is “located in another time and 
zone,” more anecdotal and immediate, and so should not be subjected 
to the investigative rigors of traditional journalism or the legal 
standards of proof for defamation.203  In the Oregon case of Obsidian
Financial Group. LLC v. Cox, a blogger Courtney Cox posted 
allegations of fraud, corruption and money laundering involving the 
plaintiff, a bankruptcy consultation business. Cox liberally injected 
her posts with hyperbolic terms such as “immoral,” “thugs,” and “evil 
 199. John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSY. & BEH. 321, 324 (2004). 
 200. David Mangan, Regulating for Responsibility: reputation and social media, 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology DOI: 10.1080/13600869.2015.1008960 
(2015).
 201. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace
49 DUKE L.J. 855, 863 (2000). 
202. Id.
 203. Karniel, supra note 194, at 218. 
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doers.”204 The US 9th Circuit Appellate Court applied its test in 
Unelko Corp. v. Rooney205 to find that the very tenor of blog language 
used by Cox “negates the impression that [she was] asserting 
objective facts.”206 The statements were posted on 
obsidianfinancesucks.com, a URL indicating that any reader would be 
predisposed to view them with a certain amount of scepticism and an 
understanding that they likely presented one-sided viewpoints rather 
than assertions of provable facts. 
Karniel argues that the role of blogs, tweets, and other citizen 
journalism is to serve as a vetting function, providing preliminary 
flagging of issues that the mainstream offline press can review for 
stories worthy of further investigation, sober thought and publication. 
Regarding the role of law in addressing defamatory remarks online, 
Karniel makes two proposals: either create a sub-category of law for 
virtual speech with more lenient levels of proof or remove it 
altogether from judicial scrutiny.207
Others have observed the legal predisposition to treat social 
media messaging as a less important form of speech garnering fewer 
constitutional protections.208 That distinction is particularly noted 
within the employment context.209 Much of social media language 
already evades traditional causes of action because it comprises 
gossip, opinion, insult, vitriol, hyperbole and creepiness.210
B.  Moving Beyond The Slander-Libel Distinction 
Distinguishing between the written and spoke word for litigation 
purposes made some sense in pre-Internet days when text was 
considered more damning because it endured over time, whereas the 
spoken word was ephemeral and, unless recorded, was unavailable at 
 204. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1233 (D. Or. 2011). 
 205. Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 206. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1294 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 207. Karniel, supra note 194, at 231 (rationalizing that most of us do not believe what we 
read online in any event).
 208. Richard Sanvenero, Social Media and our Misconceptions of the Realities, 22 INF. &
COMM. TECH. L., 89 (2013) (referring to social media, not as an absolute social good, but a 
“disease”).
 209. David Mangan, A Platform for Discipline: Social Media Speech and the Workplace,
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper 85 (2015), http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/
olsrps/85 (observing speech in traditional media in Canada and England is better protected than 
that of workers using virtual social platforms as it affects corporate reputation). 
 210. For an analysis of the latter see Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: 
Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social Norms, 35116 Y. J. L. & Tech 59, 61 (2013). 
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a later time. Such distinctions have lost relevance as our 
communications have migrated online. 211
It is a complex task to determine which cause of action best 
serves the non-traditional nature of online communications. For 
example, is a YouTube video actionable as libel or slander? What of 
podcasts? Chats? Facebook Befriending? Twitter messaging? What 
about consumer commentary displayed below a video? Is texting an 
abbreviated form of writing or speaking? What of gestures in videos? 
Further research into the nature of social media speech could address 
those uncertainties. 
The Internet has several idiosyncrasies that confound traditional 
categories of offending speech. New media communications can be, 
for example, truncated into digital semaphore;212 non-curated; 
internationally accessible; consensually anonymous and interactive;213
sent with impetuosity and archived in perpetuity with low entry 
costs.214 Posted or texted content can inform, alert, persuade, or 
convert, but it can also confound the recipient or judge who needs 
some method of translation to decode the cryptic terms, fragmentary 
style and emotional overtones. In the extreme, it is its own language 
and context. 
Linguist John McWhorter of Columbia University still works 
within the traditional distinctions when he suggests digital messaging 
is more speaking than writing. “Texting isn’t written language,” he 
claims, “[i]t much more closely resembles the kind of language we’ve 
had for so many more years: spoken language.”215 Texting is 
patterned after speaking, McWhorter proposes, — looser, telegraphic, 
and less reflective. We lack tools, however, to make a complete 
conversion: pencils, typewriters, even computers have historically 
proven too slow to keep up with the pace of human speech. The speed 
and convenience of texting on our mobile phones or tablets just might 
achieve that. 
 211. Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, SSRN, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1916212.
 212. Employing terms such as “btw” or  lmao that need context and cultural cues to 
determine intent. 
 213. Karniel, supra note 194, at 220 (confirming anonymity is well accepted by cyber 
culture).
 214. Rowbottom, supra note 195, at 356 (noting that “Words typed in seconds followed by 
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In terms of style dictating meaning, “fingered speech” is 
developing its own form and vocabulary; it does not measure a 
decline in written speech but an evolution into a new genre of 
communication, according to McWhorter, who gives as example the 
changing nuances of the acronym “lol.” With usage, McWhorter sees 
those three characters becoming something far subtler than “laughing 
out loud” or “loving you lots.” “It’s a marker of empathy,” he advises, 
“of accommodation,” what linguists call a “pragmatic particle,” like 
the word “yo.”216 Another example is the recently minted acronym 
“TLDR” which serves as disclaimer - “too long, didn’t read” or the 
use of a forward slash (/) to indicate the author is changing topic. In 
some ways, texting resembles Pitman shorthand, an American 
transcribing system from the 1950s that few would argue should be 
taken for a complete language of communication. It was semaphoric 
in style, personal, and economic in its abbreviation of words through 
symbols. For legal actors to be tasked with finding criminal intent or 
the civil standard of liability in such fragments would be akin to 
deciphering a complete unique code or language from linguistic bits 
and pieces. In addition, cultural coding must be taken into 
consideration that shapes speech to local experiences. 
C.  Keeping up with Technological Capabilities 
By putting our reliance in the court system we expose our private 
selves to judiciaries who, often by self-admission, experience 
confusion over the complexities of digital communications. Examples 
abound: in the 2010 case City of Ontario v. Quon, involving the issue 
of constitutional protection of California police communications sent 
by a paging system, US Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts 
asked in oral argument, “What’s the difference between email and a 
pager?”217 Justice Anthony Kennedy asked how a text message could 
be sent to an officer at the same time he was sending one. Former 
Justice Scalia asked, “Could Quon print these spicy little 
conversations and send them to his buddies?”218 In one journalist’s 
opinion, the implications are profound in that “speech, expression, 
and living have become intertwined in technology” so that “[i]f we’re 
ever to have a case involving Snapchat selfies and eDiscovery [argued 
216. Id.
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2016] REPUTATIONAL HARMS OF DIGITAL SPEECH 217
before the US Supreme Court], we could be in trouble.”219 It provides 
small comfort to litigants that US Justice Scalia publicly admitted to 
being “Mr. Clueless” when it comes to communications 
technology.220 Justice Elena Kagan has acknowledged that the court 
hasn’t “gotten to” e-mail yet—reportedly preferring internal 
communication by hand-written memos printed on ivory paper.221 As 
cyberlaw scholar Michael Geist commented when Internet cases were 
beginning to appear on court dockets: “The technology involved in 
Internet publication is not a matter of judicial notice of knowledge. 
Many of the words used to describe what appears to be happening on 
the screen. . . are quite obviously metaphors and the Court cannot 
assume that they accurately describe what is actually taking place.”222
Hence they struggle to use technologically neutral language to avoid 
dating or over-particularizing their decisions. 223
Technological confusion was also indicated in 2014 when US 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked a lawyer to compare 
the services of his corporate client to “iDrop in the cloud,” a non-
existent data storage system.224 She further asked about the video 
streaming service “Netflick” although, despite such gaffes, Justice 
Sotomayor is credited for venturing into unfamiliar technological 
terrain.225 Also struggling with counsel submissions during the Aereo
argument was Justice Stephen Breyer who said, “I’ve read the briefs 
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fairly carefully. . . and I’m still uncertain that I understand it well 
enough.”226 His struggles were evident when he suggested that the 
tiny broadcast antennas that Aereo sets up in a city could “pick up 
every television signal in the world and send it. . . into a person’s 
computer.”227
Lawyers also reveal gaps in digital knowledge. For example, in a 
2011 class action against Google regarding its Street View geo-
location service, the plaintiffs claimed privacy invasion under the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.228 The information 
collected, however, was from open Wi-Fi networks, requiring no 
special equipment. It was unencrypted information broadcast into 
public airspace. 
Similar concerns are expressed within the EU: a report from the 
Council of Europe states, that “in most cases, judges and prosecutors 
encounter difficulties in coping with the new realities of the cyber 
world.”229 As early as 2007 a study of European judges and litigation 
lawyers revealed significant discrepancies in their understanding of 
the technological basics of electronic evidence. Judges were found to 
hold subjective perspectives that created “multiple contradictions”; 
they were often divided in their opinions regarding the admissibility 
of electronic evidence even when provided with expert testimony.230
Other studies have acknowledged the uneven understanding by 
criminal jurists and prosecutors of information and communication 
technologies across EU jurisdictions.231
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CONCLUSION
Reputation, privacy and memory comprise a tricolor badge of 
personal identity.  While all three can be damaged by the untruthful 
expressions and data collection practices of others, we can maintain 
some command over their function if we are prepared to call on 
international legal norms to which western democracies have already 
committed in principle. This paper has described that rich inventory 
of laws, as well as current local responses within the US and EU that, 
to date, have had limited value in lowering our online reputational 
risk. The Internet is idiosyncratically over-accommodating in that 
regard in its speed, reach, replication, archiving capabilities, and 
anonymity – technological features that challenge lawmakers, in 
whatever jurisdiction, to acknowledge we are spending increasing 
amounts of our daily lives in a shared space much more powerful in 
its reputational risk potential than what we used to call mass media. 
If we are to rely on extant legal systems, we need a back-to-
basics explication of online communications so we can gain a more 
informed understanding of the nature of digital speech and structure 
gradients of harm for law reform. Much work is needed to understand 
the ontological difference of digital speech and evolving forms of 
human communication.232 Tapping the wealth of multi-disciplinarity 
is key. Superior court judiciaries might want to take leadership in this 
by re-examining their oaths of office to ensure they provide wisdom 
and guidance to those who struggle to understand law’s relevance to 
digital communications. Judges are often tasked with accommodating 
new realities while “proclaiming fidelity to the past.”233 Unlike 
Internet technology itself, developments in the law must be seen as 
continuous, not disruptive.234 Judges, in turn, have been critical of 
attorneys’ poor comprehension of digital technologies, in one case 
expressing concern that lawyers unquestioningly accept information 
from the Internet and often do not know when they should object to 
digital evidence.235
EU lawmakers as well need to continue calling to account industry 
practices that facilitate personal profiling and extreme speech that can 
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ruin the social worth and dignity of its citizens. 
Extra-legal responses include assuming individual responsibility 
for the shape of our personal identities. We can still maintain much 
control by exercising prudence in our postings and educating each 
other about their indelibility and potential for misguided 
manipulation. Microsoft announced it has commissioned research in 
Canada, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the United States that found 
that a notable 91 percent of people have made attempts to manage 
their online profile at some point but only 44 percent of adults 
actively think about the long-term consequences of their online 
activities.236 That gap must close if we are to assume reputational 
control and use social media responsibly. Curative suggestions 
include signing up for personal alerts of others posting our names 
online, taking a more aggressive role in shaping our online presence, 
using separate accounts for personal and professional profiles and 
lobbying the Internet and social media industries to rethink arbitrary 
terms of service in favor of user input on the limits of exposure we are 
prepared to endure. Within legal systems, lawmakers are encouraged 
to think more knowledgably about the changing semantic, social and 
cultural contours of language. 
As we come to know, click by click, the privacy costs of our 
social and digital engagement, and as calls increase for recognition of 
Internet access as a human right, we are urged to consider our 
important role in untying the Gordian knot. 
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